question the stability of key concepts. This, we argue, applies to Malesky though not to Fforde."  I was surprised to see my name at the top of the article. I was very happily pursuing my own style of research, hoping that more than a handful of people would read it. Gainsborough's article, however, appears to be part of a broader narrative that, I fear, is intellectually limiting as well as disre- Allow me to begin by quickly dispensing with the grandiose pretenses of the abstract and conclusion in "Malesky vs. Fforde." This article has nothing to do with research paradigms in Vietnamese Studies, and the future of ninety-five million people does not hang in the balance. It is nothing but a cursory review of two scholars' work on Vietnam. It is certainly not about ontology or epistemology. Gainsborough, by his own admission, never looks beyond the published work of the two authors. He doesn't read their references to understand the scholars that influenced them or the dialogues and debates to which they are contributing. He puts forth no effort to understand their methodological tools and conclusions they draw. He therefore has zero empirical basis to pass judgement on how a priori belief systems influence their choice of topics or findings.  The article has nothing to do with the objective validity of the data that scholars use, which is mentioned only in the abstract. Moreover, it is far from objective. Only my research receives criticism of any kind, and Gainsborough actually aligns his own thinking with Fforde three different times in the piece.  Finally, it is not, despite his initial claims to the contrary, a comprehensive or systematic review of the authors' works on Vietnam. As I will show, the articles reviewed and the examined concepts are selected with an eye to justifying the conclusion Gainsborough appears to have had in mind at the outset.
The bottom line is that "Malesky vs. Fforde" is an unsystematic and biased piece of work, which focuses primarily on word choice in the introduction and theory sections of articles, arriving at the banal conclusion that different authors focus on different things, but Gainsborough prefers work closer to (and even "drawing on") his own. The mistakes rain down in such an overwhelming torrent in "Malesky vs.
Fforde" that a concise and organized rebuttal is challenging.  Should I focus on Gainsborough's flawed and opportunistic research design? His misreading of my work? His misunderstanding of epistemology? His assertion that the words "representation" and "accountability" are "liberal" values and not core features of Vietnam's understanding of Democratic Centralism, described in its Constitution?  His reluctance to define key concepts in his analysis such as "liberal," "politics," "policy," and "state," or key evaluation criteria such as "plausibility" and "convincing"? His opaque depiction of the policy-making process in Vietnam? His belief that to study a particular institution in depth means to neglect the larger whole of Vietnamese politics? There is just too much with which to take issue-too many leaks to plug.
I also do not see any benefit in positioning my scholarship against
Fforde's. Fforde's work informed my early research program on provincial fence-breaking.  I found Gainsborough's juxtaposition of our findings to be hyperbolic. In my opinion, the key difference between Fforde and myself is about focus, and about what it means to contribute to the study of a polity.
There are two views. One is that we understand a country's politics by examining it in full, embracing the complexity, nuance, and murkiness, and problematizing every concept. The other is that we understand a country's politics by taking it apart, breaking it into manageable pieces that we can study rigorously, with the hope that a comprehensive perspective emerges from the combination of many distinct research efforts. Fforde generally holds the first view, and I hold the latter. I think students of Vietnam can benefit from considering both.
To keep my rebuttal streamlined and systematic, I have opted to weave my response into a broader discussion of research methods and contextual understanding of the Vietnamese polity. I hope it will be beneficial to the field of Vietnamese studies to constructively approach this situation. Over the next few pages, I will walk readers through the key differences between my scholarship and Gainsborough's.
Deductive vs. Inductive Scholarship
In his essay, Gainsborough highlights my use of quantitative methods.  The quantitative versus qualitative distinction is overstated, as I use and enjoy reading both. What really distinguishes my own work from Gainsborough's is that he generally values induction in his scholarship. That is, Gainsborough likes to work backward from data to theory building, reaching his conclusions after he has soaked himself in the research setting and poked around in the data.  Gainsborough enters his research unburdened by existing disciplinary theories, concepts, typologies, and comparison to other cases. There are limited building blocks for his work, and every concept is subject to debate and problematization. Gainsborough clearly articulates this approach in his book, where he explains that his approach to studying the state is not to define it, but to trust that a "more authentic picture" will eventually come into view in light by looking at how nonstate actors interact with it.  By contrast, I adhere to a deductive research approach, whereby I begin with theory building and conceptualization, and then move forward to testing. First, I identify a research puzzle or question that existing theory is unable to explain.  Second, I look to existing work on these questions, often from other countries, to better understand the current theories, debates, and concepts. Third, I construct my own theories, which build upon the excellent theoretical work of other scholars. Fourth, I work to clearly refine my theories into hypotheses that offer predictions of the outcomes we might observe if my theory is correct. When you read my work, you will often see these hypotheses bolded, indented, and marked with a capital H to highlight my theoretical predictions for readers. The next steps involve measurement, testing, and replication, which I will discuss in more detail below.  There are pros and cons to both inductive and deductive research. Inductive research is very good at identifying new puzzles and generating new hypotheses to be tested in other settings. It is an inappropriate tool for hypothesis testing, however, because the theories are molded by the original setting and environment, and it is difficult to see how well they travel to new contexts. Induction can also easily degenerate into a laundry listing approach, in which many factors are assumed to have causal importance without identifying the relative salience of particular variables. Here, induction risks being used as mere window dressing for atheoretical data mining. Unmoored by theoretical guidance, scholars can confuse themselves into believing any observed pattern is relevant.  Deductive research is more appropriate for hypothesis testing because it builds on existing scholarship and concepts.  However, deductive scholars sometimes draw inappropriate conclusions because of a mismatch between the abstract theoretical concepts they seek to measure and their actual manifestation in the research setting. Vietnam specialists often get annoyed with deductive scholars like myself for overlooking the special cultural, historical, and institutional features of Vietnam in our research designs. Indeed, every first-year political science graduate student is trained about the dangers that conceptual stretching of this nature poses for drawing inferences.  A great example of this type of mistake is Edward Miguel and Gerard Roland's study of the long-term effect of bombing in Vietnam. They used distance from the seventeenth parallel to estimate war damage and concluded that more heavily bombed places did not suffer economically from the war.  What they missed, however, is a reality that is obvious to any Vietnam specialist:
postwar transfers to poor provinces were also higher for those closer to the seventeenth parallel. In short, they thought they were measuring war exposure and ended up measuring subsequent domestic transfer policies meant to compensate for war damage.  Both induction and deduction are at their best when accompanied by a systematic and well-planned research design that guards against selection bias. They are at their worst when the research design is non-systematic and opportunistic. In the latter cases, work moves away from research to something more like a legal brief, where the author cherry-picks evidence to fit a predetermined narrative. As I will show below, Gainsborough's research This approach is familiar; Gainsborough's strength as a researcher, best exemplified by his book Vietnam: Rethinking the State, which summarizes and extends upon his research portfolio, is to challenge the prevailing wisdom in the field. For example: ) the idea that the south is more reformist;  ) whether Vietnamese politicians are pursuing reform,  and ) the centralization of the Vietnamese party-state.  In these oft-cited arguments, Gainsborough tears down the beliefs that we think are leading to the observed phenomena but rarely constructs alternative edifices to explain them. If southern leaders are no different in their reform orientation than their northern counterparts, why is the land below the seventeenth parallel so much wealthier on a GDP per capita basis with so many more private enterprises?  If Vietnamese elite leaders do not care about programmatic policy and are mostly focused on spoils, how is that major, sophisticated pieces of national legislation are passed, such as the  and  Enterprise Laws, Law on Laws, and Land Laws, and how are major public service projects delivered? Like the early Greek philosophers feared from sophists (the earliest skeptics), Gainsborough's work effectively pulls out the foundations for how we understand Vietnam, but, because he does not offer coherent alternatives, we are sometimes left knowing less about the country's politics than we did before reading his work.
Vietnam studies should be a big tent where all approaches are welcome.
Both inductive and deductive research strategies are widely practiced in the field, and the results have been enlightening. As a field we should laud and encourage both exercises. Jonathan London's edited volume provides an illustration of the diverse and fruitful approaches available in the study of 
Systematic vs. Unsystematic Data Collection
Despite their benefits, both deductive and inductive and research can be prone to confirmation bias if not wedded to systematic, objective data collection efforts. One of my core beliefs is that political analysts must distance their prior beliefs from their data. As I will explain in the next section, we need to give ourselves as researchers an opportunity to be wrong. To some extent, this is easier in a deductive research setting, where researchers have some prior sense of their hypotheses, concepts they want to measure, and the potential variation in their explanatory and outcome variables. It is more guiev and Nathan Jensen, we obviously could not survey all , operations, so we used probability sampling to derive a representative sample for analysis.  When I am doing qualitative work, such as provincial case studies, I apply a similar approach of selecting research settings based on different values of my independent variable.  I aim to be systematic for two reasons. First, I want to make sure that my selection strategy does not bias my research. For instance, I don't just want to observe the VNA query session behavior of Nguyễn Minh Thuyết or Dương Trung Quốc, because their outspokenness and bravery would provide a very distorted picture of how active and critical delegates are. The vast majority of delegates rarely speak and never criticize senior ministers. Second, I want to make sure that I am capturing the full range of activity in the observed phenomenon. If I don't do this, I might trick myself into believing that a particular activity is associated with an outcome when, in fact, it is not. For instance, a research design analyzing only the most critical speeches in parliament might find that the most aggressive speakers were all young. This would appear to be a meaningful correlation until one expanded the number of provinces under consideration and realized that there are many more delegates who are young but say nothing.
By contrast, Gainsborough does not adhere to systematic data collection in his work. He tends to follow his nose through the evidence and focuses attention on the observations that intrigue him. This approach is evident in his scholarship and in "Malesky vs. Fforde" in three different ways.
First, Gainsborough selectively focuses on the authors' biographies, a background that is vital to the argument he wants to make. Remember, Gainsborough's independent variable is the authors' a priori beliefs and his outcome variable is the topics we choose to study. A systematic approach would have looked deeply into both our backgrounds, our academic training, our non-academic policy advisory work, the courses we teach, and our writings on non-Vietnamese subjects. He might have put together a questionnaire to probe our value systems and our understanding of Vietnamese politics or interviewed us about our family histories. He might have tried a constructivist approach, looking deeply into the curricula that shaped our primary, secondary, and tertiary educations. But, Gainsborough does none of these things, and is inattentive and unbalanced in his pursuit of this knowledge. The biographical sketches are both cursory, but mine especially so. The most likely explanation for the attention given to this one article is the outcome that Gainsborough wants to achieve. My VNA work and other articles do not use the word "reformer" and therefore do not make the point he has in mind. With "Gerrymandering: Vietnam Style," however, the takeaway quote fits his preexisting conceptions of my work and his belief that I am focused on a "reformer" versus "conservative" dichotomy. This is an example of selection bias at its finest. There is a deliberately misleading footnote that I want to highlight in full, because it illustrates that Gainsborough is aware of the selection bias and acts to paint it over:
While this is one of Malesky's earlier pieces, we have checked that it is broadly representative of his later work. Later articles possibly use the language of "reformer" and "conservative" somewhat less, with terms such as "authoritarian," "VCP officials," and "dictator" being more common, but the fundamentals in terms of how he understands politics have not changed.  Gainsborough knows that my post- work does not use the word "reformer" or "conservative," except when referencing the work of other Vietnamese analysts. If Gainsborough had bothered to ask me, I would have let him know that, after that article's publication, the onset of Nguyễn Tấn Dũng administration and the closure of the Prime Minister's Research
Committee led me to the conclusion that the reformer/conservative distinction was unhelpful and so I stopped using it. If Gainsborough really wanted to check, he could have looked closely at more my recent articles on elite politics and end-of-the-year updates on Vietnamese politics that do not use that terminology, even when discussing top leaders in the Politburo.  But Gainsborough does not include them in his discussion of how my belief system is constant over time.
Rather, Gainsborough uses rhetorical flourishes to create the illusion of erroneous consistency when there is none. First, he uses the weasel words "possibly" and "broadly." If one checked and did a thorough review, this should be easily quantifiable. Do I continue to use the word or not? Second, he equates my use of the words "authoritarian," "officials," and "dictator,"
from the Vietnamese National Assembly project with "reformer" and "conservative." Thematically, these words have nothing do with each other.
Which of the words in the VNA project does he think are synonyms for "reformer"? In the first, I am classifying regime types and referring to members of the Vietnamese bureaucracy. In the latter, I was describing elite opinions about state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. Why would they in any way imply consistency? These two obvious sleights of hand reveal more about the author's research ethics and casual relationship with logic and evidence than it does my "constant" belief system.
Gainsborough's third non-systematic selection strategy is evident in the words he chooses to present as evidence and his unbalanced application thereof to myself and Fforde. As I have already noted, Gainsborough highlights my use of "liberal" words like "representation" and "accountability,"
and not the equally prevalent non-liberal words like "cooptation," "power- In this response, I don't want to argue whether Gainsborough is right or wrong in these conjectures. I only want to point out that such research designs cannot possibly deliver the objectively correct answer-only the answer Gainsborough wants. During data collection on the independent variables I think are causing change and the outcomes I want to explain, I adhere to two principles in measurement: ) validity, or how close is my measure to the concept that I want to investigate; and ) reliability; namely, can other researchers follow my approach, collect data in the same manner, and reach the same conclusions as me.  As Finally, I believe strongly in transparency and replicability. After I conduct my analysis, I post my data and computer code on my Harvard-MIT Dataverse website.  Future researchers have access to all of my raw data and every step I took in moving from the raw data to the final tables and figures that appear in the paper. They have every opportunity to dispute my findings and demonstrate where I was wrong. Recently, Jim Anderson, a World Bank economist, took issue with our transparency experiment, reanalyzing our data and reaching more optimistic conclusions.  I think the transparent debate and contestation is good for scholarly inquiry. Because of this philosophy, we also make all PCI and PAPI (Provincial Administrative Performance Index) data available to researchers, which has led to dozens of publications over the years, many by scholars based in Vietnam.
Gainsborough and I have very different views on these subjects. His theories are rarely presented in a manner that can be falsified, because he is often unclear about the steps he took and evidence he is using to draw his conclusions. His conclusion that Fforde has a better understanding of the roots of political power, for instance, is hard to contest.  
Gainsborough is H OW I R ESEA RCH
the only judge and jury in that evaluation; he doesn't give readers the data he used and that they would need to adjudicate for themselves. His concepts are not measured in a valid and reliable manner. What are the standards he uses to determine that there is "a crisis in the meaning of political authority" in Vietnam?  Would a different researcher, using the same research design, arrive at the same conclusion?
Let me illustrate the differences with a couple of telling examples. In full disclosure, I was told about the political motivation for Vietnamese provincial separations in a private conversation by a retired Vietnamese official who was close enough to Võ Văn Kiệt to know. According to the research standards that I hold, that conversation was intriguing but not evidence.
First, the conversation was private and I would never want to reveal the identity of the person who told me. I also didn't know if other well-placed individuals held the same view. I only had one anonymous source. As a result, the account was not falsifiable and the information not reliable.
Another researcher could not engage in that conversation and reach the same conclusion. Second, I did not know the motivation behind the revelation of information. Perhaps the story was not true, and the individual was simply telling a bia hơi tall tale or seeking to burnish Võ Văn Kiệt's reputation as a clever reformer. In other words, the measurement was potentially invalid. Third, to protect my source, I would never allow a full transcript of the interview to be published, allowing others to see whether I cherry-picked the story from a long interview of conflicting information. Thus, using the quote was neither transparent nor replicable.
Knowing that I could not use the quote in a publication, I decided to test the theory indirectly. In my article, I subjected the theory to six tests. First, I
needed to explore the informant's idea that SOE-dominant provinces were targeted. Figure  below provides a rough sketch of how I see things. I follow Lasswell in understanding politics as the determination of "who gets what, when, and how."  Policy consists of the sets of decisions that emerge from those discussions, setting rules or allocating resources. For me, in contrast to Gainsborough, policy is the outcome to be achieved; it is not the source of the preference. A decision that allocates more money to a defense program can be called "budget policy" or "military policy." If it takes money away from poverty alleviation programs, we can call it "redistributive policy." The  Investment Law can be referred to as "economic policy" or "regulatory policy." Equitization of SOEs can be described as "economic reform policy."
The construction of the monorail in Saigon can be called "infrastructure policy" or "public service policy." Actors enter political discussions with different preferences for what they want to accomplish and different levels of power over their ability to achieve the policy they want. Power comes from the level of resources at their disposal (budgetary, appointment, access to rents), their relative rank in the system, and their charisma and personal following.
Preferences are informed by many ingredients, but most research tends to focus on three. First, actors may have programmatic goals (e.g. economic growth, poverty alleviation, environmental protection). Some of the motivation for programmatic goals may have been informed and influenced by Discussions and deliberations are shaped by institutions, which can constrain or empower different political actors. In all of the policy decisions that I have highlighted above, actors entered them with programmatic, clientelistic, or ideological goals. Most of the time, actors hold all three types of preferences, and it is extremely difficult to separate them.
The debate between Võ Văn Kiệt and Nguyễn Văn Linh over the  kW power transmission cable in the second volume of Huy Đức's Bên Thắng Cuộc beautifully illustrates how I see the policy process in Vietnam.  In , Vietnam was facing a tremendous developmental problem. As southern Vietnamese economy boomed in the wake of economic liberalization, it began to run into constraints posed by insufficient electricity. In parts of the rural south, electricity penetration was low and suffered repeated blackouts and brownouts due to usage by the growing business sector. By contrast, a Soviet-installed power plant in Hòa Bình province was generating a surplus of energy for the northern economy.  Nguyễn Văn Linh, who had recently left the General Secretary position and was serving as a counselor to the Politburo, recommended selling surplus northern energy to China, and using the proceeds to expand energy capacity in the south. Võ Văn Kiệt was suspicious of selling valuable resources to China and believed that the southern energy crisis was too immediate for Nguyễn Văn Linh's long-term strategy. He wanted it done in two years.  Võ Văn Kiệt therefore put forward a technologically risky strategy that had been dreamed up by Vũ Ngọc Hải and his staff at the Ministry of Energy. Vietnam would construct a nationwide cable that would transport the excess northern electricity directly to the south. The plan was extremely controversial; technical experts in Japan and multilateral organizations doubted Vietnam's capacity to build it, and the estimated costs were $ million USD, roughly % of Vietnam's GDP at the time.  General Secretary Đỗ Mười allegedly consented verbally, but no Politburo or Central Committee resolution offered official approval for Võ Văn Kiệt's plan before construction. Rather, Võ Văn Kiệt asserted his authority under the constitution as Prime Minister to allocate expenditures and direct his administration.  His position was bolstered when he was able to mobilize a small development grant from Australia to marginally offset the cost. The line was completed in  and began to transmit electricity, playing a critical role in Vietnam's extraordinarily high energy penetration rates among developing countries.  However, at the government party to celebrate the line's creation, Võ Văn Kiệt was the sole politburo member to make an appearance. The others boycotted.  Notice that both Võ Văn Kiệt and Nguyễn Văn Linh offered programmatic proposals for a clear developmental dilemma that they agreed needed resolution. However, clientelistic exchange was certainly not absent. Energy sales to China were likely to offer substantial opportunities for padding and kickbacks, and the line's construction involved ample rent-seeking opportunities in land sales and construction contracts. Vũ Ngọc Hải was eventually jailed for the latter.  It is entirely possible that a political actor could have supported either proposal programmatically while knowing there was a good chance to benefit personally from the decision. Ideological and political factors were also evident. Võ Văn Kiệt saw opportunities to bolster political support in the south, and Nguyễn Văn Linh worried about state resources being exploited by Western investors.
Both also brought different power resources to the table. Nguyễn Văn Linh leveraged his authority within the party and his personal charisma. Võ Văn Kiệt leveraged the institutional powers allocated to him under the  Constitution. Indeed, his stance was the first documented claim to government independence and authority over budget and staff, and would contribute to the dispersal of executive power in Vietnam that distinguishes it from other single-party regimes like China and Cuba.  This story wonderfully illustrates how programmatic and clientelistic preferences, different sources of power, and institutional rules converge in Vietnam to lead to policy outcomes that simultaneously propel development and potentially line officials' pockets. In short, politics in Vietnam is about policymaking, but politicians have both programmatic and clientelistic goals. Most policy outcomes can be understood as a combination of these preferences and the relative power of the actors involved in the debates. The mix varies across different institutions, levels of government, and technical H OW I R ESEA RCH policy debates; therefore, careful research designs are necessary for understanding which factor prevailed in the outcome. We need not, as Gainsborough asserts, take strong stands on which of these factors is more important than the other.  If Gainsborough adheres to his quote above, there is a big disagreement between us here. But I suspect that our positions are probably closer than the distinction he appears to be drawing in his publications.
Institutions
One final distinction of my work is that I am unapologetically focused on Vietnamese institutions. In doing so, I am heavily influenced by the work of Douglass North in defining institutions as the "rules of the game"  and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in how institutions can constrain political actors, allocate information among parties, and shape the outcomes we see above.  Rule breaking certainly occurs in Vietnam, but I am fascinated by the fact that even in the way political actors skirt the rules, they demonstrate a deference to institutional constraints in how they hide and justify their behavior.
Constitutional changes and party statutes are fiercely debated, because actors take the rules seriously and generally abide by the outcomes. In the  Party Congress, for instance, after being disappointed by the Politburo decision not to nominate Nguyễn Tấn Dũng for General Secretary, his supporters attempted to take advantage of arcane party rules for floor nominations. Analysts were on the edge of their seats to see if they could get enough provincial delegations to support Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, allowing him to be considered and overriding the politburo recommendation.  Creative application of the institutional rules can strengthen incumbent actors, but has also been cleverly exploited by those seeking change.
My work has studied district and provincial administrations, the VNA elections and organizational system, the Central Committee, and institutions like the Party Congress, Central Committee, and Politburo. I have even studied the impact of international institutions like the WTO and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on Vietnam. My research has also examined, in intricate detail, the specific rules of these bodies, exploring how they choose their members, make decisions, interact with other bodies, and influence nonstate actors like businesses. Furthermore, I am interested in unwritten, informal institutions such as the retirement age, regional representation in the Politburo, and consultation norms between branches of government.
A reasonable critique of my research program is that by focusing so much attention on institutions, I have neglected to recognize that they are the result of preexisting power constellations. Political actors choose the institutions they want in order to more easily achieve their policy preferences, be they clientelistic, programmatic, or ideological.  The changes we have observed over time in the VNA rules and composition and in the relationship between the Central Committee and Politburo are not accidental. They were changed with an eye to the policy outcomes they would deliver. The only place where I have considered that issue much at all is in my work with Regina Abrami and Yu Zheng, when we discussed the origins of the  Party Statutes and  Constitution.  If that is the criticism that Gainsborough is leveling when he says that my focus on the VNA is a "distraction from political realities,"  then I accept it. I have sincerely struggled to find methods to study institutional creation and change with any detail. 
Conclusion
I will admit to some frustration and disorientation in facing examination by an academic, who, while calling himself a political scientist, is not familiar with my discipline's concepts, debates, specialties, and research practices, and makes no effort to understand them. In my less generous moments, I imagined myself following this approach, by picking up the New England Journal of Medicine, doing cursory word counts of the introductory sections of articles, and passing judgment on their conclusions: "This nephrologist frequently uses words like 'kidney,' 'diabetes,' and 'dialysis.'" I checked and saw that he possibly uses these words in other publications as well, but never subjects the term "dialysis" to critical examination. Clearly, his a priori beliefs about the importance of the kidney lead him to neglect the heart, brain, and soul, which, I believe, are far more important for understanding the workings of the human body."
Gainsborough is absolutely right in his diagnosis that prior beliefs can influence and bias scholarship. But he is mistaken about both the remedy and the patient's identity. I rely on extant theory to sharpen my predictions, and I have clear perspective about how the Vietnamese policy process works and a taste for focusing on institutions as an intriguing contributor to policy outcomes, be they programmatic or clientelistic. However, I take serious steps to insulate my pretest opinions from the conclusions I draw. Of course, my Vietnamese coauthors can speak for themselves, but
Gainsborough does not acknowledge their voices in the first place, and that is a mistake. Most of Gainsborough's assertions are due to his own biased selection and presentation. They are unfounded, naïve, and, it has to be said, somewhat orientalist.  I hope my rebuttal and clarification of the important work of my colleagues will go to some lengths to correct this, but I strongly believe this should have been avoided in the first place. There are many unanswered puzzles about how the Vietnamese polity came to be, how it currently functions, and where it is going. To rise to these challenges, we must be inclusive. We need the full artillery of methods and approaches currently available in the field. We should read each other's work, build upon each other's insights, and debate vigorously when we disagree, secure in the knowledge that we are all working toward a shared enterprise. We should take the evidence of all scholars seriously, and when we see things differently, we should contest that evidence fairly and honestly.
To dismiss a scholar's findings based on the country where they happen to work  or their proximity to a discipline  limits the information on the table and biases judgments. We are smarter and better researchers than that.
Sadly, "Malesky vs. Fforde" was a missed opportunity to advance our shared scholarly pursuits. An article that dropped the family names from the underlying evidence and clearly delineated the most urgent substantive disagreements in the field would have been a much more fruitful contribution. Gainsborough, he argues that the party-state was increasingly just a vehicle for powerful people to pursue their interests…" and "To reiterate, as Fforde saysagain drawing on Gainsborough-that it is all about "spoils" (i.e., elites feathering their nests). In footnote , Gainsborough cites his work on actors outside party structures and the nature of the Vietnamese state, which are also themes for which he praises Fforde's work. . Gainsborough even manages to get my academic title wrong. . See Gainsborough, "Malesky vs. Sometimes, the puzzles are comparative, such as why Vietnam and China both grew at such rapid rates but inequality increases in China were more pronounced (see Edmund Malesky, Regina Abrami, and Yu Zheng, "Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of
